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Policy-Making 
 ALBERTO  ALEMANNO  AND  ANNE-LISE  SIBONY 
 NUDGE AND THE Law took as a point of the departure the growing inter-est, in both policy and academic circles, towards the use of behavioural sciences in policy-making. Our goal was to explore the major implications 
of such use for the legal system, in particular that of the European Union. 
 In this conclusive chapter we do not intend to summarise each individual con-
tribution; rather, we aim to draw lessons on what EU law can learn from behav-
ioural sciences from the examples reviewed in this volume. These lessons can be 
organised in two major lines of enquiry, which characterise the incipient nudge 
debate generally. Section I explores when is it legitimate for public authorities to 
use psychology and other related behavioural sciences to inform policy. Section II 
examines how can, in practice, behavioural insights be incorporated into the 
decision-making processes. While not all individual contributors have expressly 
addressed these queries, they have — if implicitly — taken a stance on those issues, 
which are central to the emergence of behavioural informed intervention. In line 
with the declared objective of our editorial venture, in this conclusive chapter, we 
strive to unpack our contributors ’ major fi ndings in order to provide a European 
perspective over both the issues of legitimacy and that of practicability of behav-
ioural informed action. Where needed, we contrast it with the US- dominated 
nudge debate. Finally, we offer some conclusive remarks aimed at sketching the 
future research agenda of European scholars interested in the integration of 
behavioural sciences into the law. 
 I. LEGITIMACY 
 Given the portrayal of behavioural regulation as an instrument of an emerging 
manipulative, nudging state, the legitimacy debate surrounds — and sometimes 
monopolises — the public discourse prompted by nudging. It is therefore no 
 surprise that a great deal of academic attention has been paid to the  philosophical, 
326 Alberto Alemanno and Anne-Lise Sibony
ethical and other abstract implications of such a prospect. 1 The major concerns 
involve autonomy, 2 dignity, 3 and moral development 4 as well as a less defi ned 
risk of manipulation. Several contributions to this volume build on this literature 
and add to the legitimacy debate by offering a European or, more specifi cally, an 
EU-oriented analysis. 
 In this section, we fi rst build upon the refl exions gathered in this volume around 
the issue of legitimacy of behavioural intervention in an attempt to reformulate 
the legitimacy debate in light of the European perspective (A). In particular, we 
discuss the need to rethink the relationship between autonomy and deliberation in 
the light of the notion of  ‘ choice architecture ’ and that of  ‘ mental bandwidth ’ 5 (B). 
We claim that, given the inherent constraints to our own ability to choose, auton-
omy should be rethought. Several contributors to this volume share this conclu-
sion and advance some recommendations to this purpose. We then highlight the 
importance of cultural differences in shaping the socio-legal context in which we 
discuss the legitimacy of behavioural interventions (C). Differences in administra-
tive, legal, political and philosophical culture contribute to the formation of very 
different contexts, which in turn infl uence the legitimacy discourse on both sides 
of the Atlantic. We refer to this multifactorial and multifaceted phenomenon as 
cultural differences in regulatory philosophy. Finally, some concluding remarks 
highlight why and how the EU appears less likely to offer strong resistance to the 
use of behavioural insights in its own legal order based on legitimacy grounds. 
 A. Autonomy and the Inevitability of Choice Architecture 
 Autonomy is a central concern in any discussion on behavioural intervention. 
The classic ethical debate surrounding nudge starts with a principled defence of 
normative individualism, that is the ability to order our lives according to our 
 1  See, eg  S  Conly ,  Against Autonomy — Justifying Coercive Paternalism ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge 
University Press ,  2013 ) ;  R  Rebonato ,  Taking Liberties — A Critical Examination of Libertarian 
Paternalism ( New York ,  Palgrave Macmillian ,  2012 ) ;  MD  White ,  The Manipulation of Choice: Ethics 
and Libertarian Paternalism ( Palgrave MacMillan ,  2013 ) ;  C  Sunstein ,  ‘ The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral 
Economics and Paternalism ’ ( 2013 )  122  Yale Law Journal  1826 et seq;  PG  Hansen and  AM  Jespaersen , 
 ‘ Nudge and the Manipulation of Choice:  A Framework for the Responsible Use of the Nudge Approach 
to Behaviour Change in Public Policy ’ ( 2013 )  4 ( 1 )  European Journal of Risk Regulation  3 ;  E  Selinger and 
 K  Whyte ,  ‘ Is There a Right Way to Nudge? The Practice and Ethics of Choice Architecture ’ ( 2011 )  5 ( 10 ) 
 Sociology Compass  923 ;  L  Bovens ,  ‘ Real Nudge ’ ( 2012 )  3 ( 1 )  European Journal of Risk Regulation  43 and, 
lastly, C Sunstein,  ‘ The Ethics of Nudge ’ (2015, forthcoming). 
 2  JD  Wright and  DH  Ginsburg ,  ‘ Behavioral Law and Economics:  Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Impli-
cations for Liberty ’ ( 2012 )  106  Northwestern University Law Review  1033 . 
 3  J Waldron,  ‘ It ’ s All for Your Own Good ’ (2014) New York Review of Books; and C McCrudden, 
 ‘ Nudging and Human Dignity ’ ,  VerfBlog , 6 January 2015, available at  www.verfassungsblog.de/
nudging-human-dignity/ . 
 4  L  Bovens ,  ‘ The Ethics of Nudge ’ in  T  Gr ü ne-Yanoff and  SO  Hansson (eds),  Preference Change: 
Approaches from Philosophy, Economics and Psychology ( New York ,  Springer ,  2008 )  207 – 20 . 
 5  S  Mullainathan and  E  Shafi r ,  Scarcity:  Why Having Too Little Means So Much ( New York ,  Times 
Books ,  2013 ) . 
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decisions, which governs our modern constitutional states. 6 Critics of behav-
ioural policy-making argue that nudging constitutes an infringement on indi-
vidual autonomy because, despite its choice-preserving promise, it inevitably 
involves an unacceptable substitution of individual preferences with government 
 preferences. 7 Such substitution — they claim — is only legitimate in a very limited 
set of  circumstances. 8 In the case of less visible behavioural interventions, this 
objection seems particularly strong. 
 According to this view, autonomy is reduced every time a policy intervention lev-
erages an element of individual decision-making process other than  deliberation. 9 
In particular, the claim is that autonomy is unacceptably reduced when a person 
could not uncover the manipulation even if she used her best effort to activate 
refl ective thinking. 10 In line with this argument, many object to any intervention 
aiming to change consumption patterns of energy, alcohol, or food by altering the 
defaults or providing information. 11 
 However, to fully address this critique of nudging it is necessary to unpack its 
premises, in particular the relationship it assumes between autonomy and delib-
eration. As highlighted by Baldwin, public nudging is not a monolith and must 
be broken down into at least three different categories depending on the impact 
of public intervention on individual autonomy. According to this perspective, 
fi rst degree nudges consist of  ‘ mere ’ provision of information (eg labelling), 
second degree nudges rely on biases and heuristics but can be detected (eg defaults), 
whereas third degree nudges shape decisions and preferences in a manner that is 
 ‘ resistant to unpacking ’ (eg vivid warnings). If analysed against the autonomy cri-
tique, the fi rst two categories of nudges appear less problematic than the third one. 
In general terms, this is the case because while the fi rst two categories of nudges are 
predominantly directed to System 2, third degree nudges target instead System 1. 
The latter nudges being the most insidious, often acting at the visceral level, 12 
emerge as one of the most Machiavellic forms of intervention. 
 In the case of defaults, the possibility of an opt-out seems apt to address the 
liberal reservations typically associated with regulatory limitation of autonomy. 13 
 6  D  von der Pfordten ,  ‘ Five Elements of Normative Ethics — A General Theory of Normative 
 Individualism ’ ( 2012 )  Ethic Theory Moral Practice  449 . 
 7  For a classic account see, eg  EL  Glaeser ,  ‘ Paternalism and Psychology ’ [ 1973 ]  University of Chicago 
Law Review  133, 136 – 39 . See also  R  Rebonato ,  Taking Liberties — A Critical Examination of Libertarian 
Paternalism ( New York ,  Palgrave Macmillian ,  2012 ) . 
 8  In this volume,  ch 4 by Anne van Aacken expresses this view. On the diffi culties associated with 
identifying these circumstances, see Conly (n 1). 
 9  R  Baldwin ,  ‘ From Regulation to Behaviour Change:  Giving Nudge the Third Degree ’ ( 2014 )  77 
 MLR  831 . 
 10  See in this volume,  ch 3 by M Quigley and E Stokes, and  ch 10 by A Alemanno. See also  B  Bogart , 
 Regulating Obesity ( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2013 ) . 
 11  For an illustration, see  E  Johnson et al,  ‘ Defaults, Framing and Privacy:  Why Opting In — Opting 
Out ’ ( 2002 )  13  Marketing Letters  5 . 
 12  R  Calo ,  ‘ Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere) ’ ( 2012 )  87  Notre Dame Law 
Review  1027 . 
 13  See, eg Rebonato (n 1); White (n 1)  ch 4 . 
328 Alberto Alemanno and Anne-Lise Sibony
By defi nition, a default rule — such as automatic enrolment in a pension scheme —
 enables the addressee to opt out and decide not to save. If the (formal) possibility 
to choose is the issue, surely that possibility still exists. Yet, according to some, 
this is insuffi cient to legitimise the underlying manipulation of a default change. 14 
Individuals should still be allowed to exercise actual choice regardless of the 
 context in which they are called upon to make that choice. 
 The classic counter-argument to this perspective is that choice architectures have 
to be determined one way or another since neutral default scenarios do not exist. 15 
Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, default rules such as automatic renewal 
for a magazine subscription, although typically disguised, do not fall from the sky 
but are the fruit of a deliberate choice of businesses. 16 Therefore, behaviourally 
informed intervention can be legitimised by the need to offset the negative conse-
quences stemming from the established defaults that do not promote the greater 
good but only the interests of the relevant industries. 17 This is what underpins the 
regulatory strategy known as  ‘ debiasing through law ’ . As Jolls and Sunstein point 
out, this strategy is legitimate to address clear cases of errors (eg perception of risk 
different from statistical risk). 18 Beyond this safe harbour — where behavioural 
intervention can hardly be criticised as a violation of autonomy 19 — the legitimacy 
debate needs to take place on all interventions that more broadly seek to rely on 
behavioural insights in the pursuit of objectives considered legitimate by the pubic 
authorities. The whole space of behavioural intervention open to debate — from 
straightforward debiasing cases to more complex cases for intervention — is what 
we call public nudging. 20 Public nudging is characterised by the intention to help 
people correct errors they may be subject to and avoid short sightedness in their 
choices. We fi nd it helpful to have an additional, specifi c label for public inter-
ventions that respond to exploitative use of behavioural foibles by market forces. 
We call this  ‘ counter-nudging ’ . This notion tries to capture our belief that, when 
discussing legitimacy concerns about behavioural public intervention, regulation 
of private infl uence ought to be distinguished from pure government infl uence on 
people. This is because, as argued in the introductory chapter, these two types of 
behavioural intervention raise different objections and call for different levels of 
scrutiny. 21 
 14  ibid. 
 15  For the most recent formulation, see Sunstein,  ‘ The Ethics of Nudge ’ (n 1). 
 16  For a recent, powerful critique of marketing power and the need to  ‘ fi ght back ’ , see  G  Hastings , 
 The Marketing Matrix:  How the Corporation Gets Its Power and How We Can Reclaim It ( London , 
 Routledge ,  2014 ) . 
 17  For a similar perspective,  A  Oliver ,  Behavioural Public Policy ( Cambridge ,  Cambridge  University 
Press ,  2013 )  13 . For a more conceptual approach to behaviour, market and policy,  MS  Barr , 
 ‘ Behaviourally Informed Regulation ’ in  E  Shafi r (ed),  The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy 
( Princeton ,  Princeton University Press ,  2012 )  440 – 61 . 
 18  C  Jolls and  C  Sunstein ,  ‘ Debiasing through Law ’ ( 2006 ),  35  Journal of Legal Studies  199, 230 . 
 19  As illustrated in our introductory chapter, these are circumstances in which even libertarians may 
agree on state intervention insofar as this may promote — rather than threaten — individual freedom. 
See in this volume,  ch 1 by A Alemanno and AL Sibony. 
 20  See in this volume,  ch 1 by A Alemanno and AL Sibony. 
 21  ibid. 
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 B. Autonomy and Individual Deliberation 
 In this volume, several contributions touch upon the relationship between auton-
omy, deliberation and legitimacy of public intervention. The classical autonomy 
arguments are presented by van Aaken. She argues that invisible nudges operat-
ing on the fast, unrefl ective, emotional system of thinking  ‘ entail a subtle form 
of manipulation by taking advantage of the human tendency to act unrefl ec-
tively and, to that extent, are inconsistent with demonstrating respect for indi-
vidual autonomy ’ . 22 This argument assumes that conscious individual refl ection 
is the touchstone of autonomy and asserts that, as a result, infl uencing individual 
 decisions by targeting System 1 constitutes in itself an infringement on autonomy. 
 To see in what sense autonomy could be limited by behavioural interven-
tion, one ought to consider not only the meaning of  ‘ autonomy ’ , but also that 
of  ‘ restriction ’ . To use an analogy with competition law, a restriction of competi-
tion is appraised in the light of the competition that is reasonably possible on 
a given market. This entails taking into account the constraints resulting both 
from market characteristics and existing regulation. There is only a restriction of 
competition if undertakings distort through their behaviour whatever competi-
tion can reasonably be expected  in the context . 23 Where no effective competition is 
possible, whatever undertakings do is not a restriction of competition. Similarly, 
a realistic appraisal of what counts as a restriction of individual autonomy on 
the part of public authorities should take into account what can reasonably be 
expected of humans making a decision in a given context. In other words, how 
much autonomy is likely to be exercised in a given context should matter when 
assessing whether and how much behavioural intervention restricts autonomy. 
 For instance, when purchasing a song online, extremely few people would deem 
it worth their time to read 68 pages of terms and conditions. In such a situation, 
it is entirely reasonable to assume that little attention will be expanded in mak-
ing the decision to engage in the transaction. Behavioural consumer protection 
laws could prohibit lengthy text and mandate instead very short statements or 
icons. In a case such as this one, the objection to behavioural intervention in the 
name of autonomy seems entirely abstract and outright unconvincing. It is of 
course possible to argue that, by giving up on providing consumers with all the 
information needed to make a fully informed choice, behavioural consumer pro-
tection deprives individuals of an opportunity to exercise their autonomy. It is 
possible but lacks either common sense or good faith. The more reasonable view 
is that there is no restriction because consumers would in all likelihood not have 
availed themselves of the possibility of making a fully informed decision. Since life 
is too short to devote our time pondering upon every singly choice we face, our 
 understanding of autonomy should be less idealised. Perhaps deliberation is not 
the only hallmark of autonomy. 
 22  Chapter 4 in this volume by A van Aaken. 
 23  See, eg Joined Cases 209 – 15  & 218/78  van Landewyck a.o. v Commission , EU:C:1980:248, 
para 153; Joined Cases 240, 241, 242, 261, 262, 268  & 269/82  Stichting Sigarettenindustrie a.o. v 
Commission , EU:C:1985:488, para 96. 
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 We recognise of course that not all cases are as simple as the disproportion-
ately lengthy terms and conditions. Where individual differences in behaviour are 
large or where their magnitude is unknown, it is diffi cult to assess what would  ‘ in 
all likelihood ’ have happened. Only progress in empirical behavioural knowledge 
will bridge this analytical gap. Our point here is only to address what we feel is an 
overbroad use of the notion of  ‘ restriction of autonomy ’ . 
 Equally, we do not want to suggest that mandatory simplifi ed disclosure is a 
miracle cure. 24 People may of course still ignore information given to them in 
 simplifi ed, smarter form. Yet, if anything, such mandated simplifi cation makes 
it more likely (not less) that the addressees — consumers in this case — will con-
sciously take it into account and make a minimally but suffi ciently informed 
decision. In this sense, harnessing the power of fast thinking — in our example 
by mandating more effi cient communication of information — increases (from 
a very low baseline) the probability that autonomy is meaningfully (if not fully 
 deliberatively) exercised. 25 
 Holding, on the contrary, that  ‘ autonomy ’ is  reduced every time interven-
tion targets System 1 amounts to the paradoxical view that individual decision-
making deserves, in principle, the same degree of protection against interference 
by government, irrespective of whether deliberate refl ective choice or automatic 
decision-making is at stake. To embrace this argument leads to severing the link 
between autonomy and deliberation. Autonomy, then, would be characterised by 
the freedom to determine one ’ s goals — even mindlessly — and without distinction 
between immediate goals and possibly confl icting higher order or long-term goals. 
To us, this seems a singularly confusing and rather abstract notion of autonomy. 
Only individual choice fetishism can support such an overbroad understanding of 
the notion. Intuitively, some choices deserve more protection than others. 
 Behaviourally inspired interventions take it for granted that individual ’ s choices 
often do not reveal stable preferences. They maintain well-being as the norma-
tive criterion but detach the defi nition of well-being from individual, autonomous 
choice. This disconnect causes unease but overstretching the concept of autonomy 
begs the question of its real boundaries. For this reason, defi ning autonomy in 
terms of an absolute right to set one ’ s preferences over a range of outcomes is not 
very helpful. We propose instead to rethinking autonomy as a specifi c way of mak-
ing decisions in a given context. 
 Under this view, a whole range of behavioural interventions would be neutral 
vis- à -vis the exercise of autonomy. 26 Such would be the case of intervention that 
aims to change the outcome of individual decisions (eg to foster enrollment in a 
pension plan or joining an organ donor register) but does not purport to change 
 24  O  Ben-Shahar and  C  Schneider ,  More than You Wanted to Know:  The Failure of Mandated 
 Disclosure ( Princeton ,  Princeton University Press ,  2014 ) . 
 25  For a broader claim that, if we allow public authorities to make (certain) decisions for us (eg by 
changing the defaults), we gain not only in personal welfare but also in autonomy see, eg Conly (n 1). 
See also on this point, Sunstein,  ‘ The Ethics of Nudge ’ (n 1). 
 26  This is however not necessarily true vis- à -vis other values, such as dignity. See McCrudden (n 3). 
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how the choice is actually made. Nudging people when they would not deliber-
ate does not reduce autonomy. Behavioural interventions rather steer behaviour 
 within the sphere that people navigate using System 1. Nudges improve navigability 
in life: they do not awaken rationality but do not  reduce the sphere of deliberation 
either. This seems to be true for all three types of nudges identifi ed by Baldwin. Yet, 
besides behavioural interventions targeting either System 1 (framing, vivid warn-
ings) or 2 (provision of information), there seems to exist a fourth category that 
seeks to prompt a switch from System 1 to System 2. Examples include reminders, 
but also choice prompts aimed at triggering a deliberative, instead of an auto-
matic, choice. 27 This last category of measures ( ‘ System 2 wake up! ’ measures) are 
more intrusive because by prompting active choosing they interfere with the pro-
cess of decision-making. 28 It may of course be legitimate to awaken rationality. It 
enhances autonomy in the classical sense, because it seeks to extend the domain of 
deliberation, but it is nonetheless intrusive. This is because, unlike mere nudging, 
it interferes with a second order choice: the choice of a mental process (automatic 
vs deliberative). Given the limited number of decisions we can take fully delib-
eratively, we need to select the instances for which we keep our scarce deliberative 
resources. This second order  ‘ choice ’ is often unconscious though it can be made 
conscious. The decision-making pattern of an individual is shaped by environ-
ment and by experience. 29 It may be viewed as more intimate and more identity-
defi ning than preferences regarding outcomes (think for example about reading/
not reading an instruction manual: mostly this is experienced as a personality trait 
with which interference is not welcome). Although this is an empirical question 
in need of investigation, individual attitudes towards alternative ways of making a 
decision may well prove more stable than preferences. If this is so, the question is 
whether a meaningful notion of autonomy should include the freedom for every 
individual to decide what decisions she wants to take refl ectively and what deci-
sions she is happy to take automatically. This would seem to be a stronger defence 
of autonomy and one that would apply beyond nudges to other forms of behav-
iourally oriented intervention. 
 In this line of thinking, interference with cognitive processes — and in particular 
with the balance an individual strikes between decisions driven by System 1 and 
those shaped by System 2 — should raise more legitimacy concerns than interfer-
ence with preferences regarding outcomes. 30 In line with a more orthodox view, 
 27  Note this is not a new modus operandi for public intervention. Cooling off periods rely on the 
natural re-awakening offered by the granting of time ex post choice. 
 28  One may observe that also defaults, depending on how they are framed, might induce the regulatee 
to come to realisation that she might opt out and therefore trigger a switch from System 1 to System 2 
decision process. 
 29  For an accessible account of such switches, see  J  Lehrer ,  How We Decide ( Houghton Miffl in ,  2009 ) . 
 30  This is because preferences, unlike what is assumed in neoclassical economics, are not stable and 
do not characterise an individual. Decision-making patterns owe more to a person ’ s personality and 
life history. They constitute individual characteristics in a much deeper sense than preferences, which 
can be transient and superfi cial. As such, they deserve to be interfered with only with caution. 
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van Aaken in her contribution expresses the opinion that  ‘ It is hard to justify a state 
keeping its citizens in the  “ fast thinking ” mode in cases where a  “ slow thinking ” 
mode can be initiated ’ . 31 The diffi culty with this argument is scarcity of  attention. 32 
We simply do not have the cognitive resources to take all the decisions slowly. 
Therefore, we — either individually or collectively — need to decide what set of 
decisions we take deliberatively and what set of decisions we take  automatically. 33 
If people constantly had to make choices deliberatively, their autonomy would in 
fact be reduced. 34 Therefore, respecting individual differences in the way people 
manage their limited  ‘ mental bandwidth ’ — to use the terminology of Mullaina-
than and Shafi r 35 — would seem a better, and more demanding agenda for those 
who wish to object to behavioural regulation on principled grounds. For our part, 
we think that interference with decision-making processes can be justifi ed on 
policy grounds. Our point is that this kind of interference is the one that deserves 
more careful scrutiny than interference with so-called preferences, because 
 ‘ preferences ’ are a construct that does not capture well what deserves protection 
from government interference both because those are often not deeply ingrained 
and because they are often the product of market forces. 
 As previously observed, and contrary to conventional wisdom, not all behav-
ioural interventions target System 1 only. Many target both System 1 and System 2. 
Smart information disclosure requirements, for example, are specifi cally designed 
to ensure that choices are informed. 36 They rely in part on the functioning of 
System 1 to catch our attention but do seek to prompt refl ection about our 
preferred course of action in a way that dull disclosures do not (because they 
are ignored). In a situation of lack of information, limited information or bias, 
such behavioural interventions do not infringe individual autonomy. 37 Under the 
classical view of autonomy (which is inherently related to deliberation), they rather 
make the decision  more autonomous by rendering it more deliberative than the 
heteronomous decisions taken under the infl uence of choice architectures designed 
by corporations to serve private interests. Under the procedural view of autonomy 
just outlined, there is no reduction in autonomy when interventions seek to steer 
behaviour  within the sphere that people navigate using System 2. Such is the case 
not only for the provision of information and defaults — which target System 2 — 
but also for reminders and prompt choices — which although target System 1 aim 
at awakening System 2. 
 31  For a similar argument, prioritising education over behavioural intervention, see  G  Gigerenzer , 
 Risk Savvy:  How to Make Good Decisions ( New York ,  Penguin Group ,  2014 ) . 
 32  Mullainathan and Shafi r (n 5). 
 33  In the absence of a collective decision, it is the market alone that is set to shape — through adver-
tising and other marketing techniques — how individuals strike a balance between their deliberative 
and automatic selves. 
 34  Sunstein,  ‘ The Ethics of Nudge ’ (n 1). 
 35  Mullainathan and Shafi r (n 5). 
 36  Sunstein,  ‘ The Ethics of Nudge ’ (n 1). 
 37  However, while a nudge might be justifi ed when it helps counteracting a behavioural bias, such a 
bias is not a necessary justifi cation for a nudge-type intervention. Sunstein,  ‘ The Ethics of Nudge ’ (n 1). 
Epilogue: Future of EU Behavioural Policy-Making 333
 This discussion shows that individual autonomy is in need of a rethink. Although 
autonomy is a fundamental value, its operationalisation in an age characterised 
by a rapid increase in cognitively-intensive tasks requires more nuanced views 
as to what individual decisions deserve protection from interference by govern-
ment. As a matter of fact, not all decisions are equally deliberative. Normatively, 
it is not equally important that all individual decisions be taken more refl ectively. 
This implies that prompting deliberation, while often viewed positively, does not 
always enjoy the same degree of legitimacy. Autonomy, if it is to remain a mean-
ingful value, should not require conscious, active and deliberative choice all the 
time. The protection of autonomy, which ought to be provided by constitutional 
rules, needs to be devised in a fl exible way so as to allow individuals, businesses, 
and public authorities to deal with bounded rationality in the pursuit of their 
respective legitimate goals. 
 In other words, those concerned with autonomy should not confi ne their argu-
ment to the abstract availability of choices; they should consider the distinct 
imperative to respect the balance between those decisions we want to take delib-
erately and those that we prefer to take automatically. It is for each individual 
to strike a balance between these modes of decision-making. Arguably, this is a 
dimension of individual autonomy that deserves closer consideration in the dis-
cussion on the legitimacy of public nudging and perhaps more generally. As we 
cannot realistically decide everything in life in a deliberative manner, deliberation 
cannot be the touchstone of what we value and protect in individual decisions 
under the name of autonomy. Instead, the focus should shift to when and how 
we accept to be assisted or infl uenced in our decision-making, either by private or 
public intervention. In this perspective, behaviourally informed intervention will 
appear problematic in far fewer circumstances than is generally thought because it 
generally improves navigability of choices. This revised perspective on autonomy 
does not however legitimise all behavioural interventions. If this were the case, the 
new perspective would be useless as it would amount to neutralising autonomy as 
a normative criterion to assess the legitimacy of public intervention. This is not 
what we have in mind. Rather, we invite lawyers and philosophers to look into 
what could be called a procedural conception of autonomy — where the term does 
not refer to legal procedures but to decision-making procedures. Future research 
should aim at identifying more precisely what restricts autonomy in a world in 
which autonomous decisions cannot realistically be equated with decisions taken 
in a fully deliberative manner. 
 C. Publicity and Collective Deliberation 
 A related but distinct element in the autonomy discourse is the level at which the 
relevant deliberation takes place. In the classical argument just discussed, the focus 
is on individual deliberation. Yet, one critical question for behaviour change strat-
egies in any policy area is how targeted population groups are collectively involved 
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in the decisions that are taken as well as in the associated development, implemen-
tation, monitoring, and evaluation of strategies. As noted by Jolls and Sunstein, 
 there is no reason to think government would have to conceal or make ambiguous its 
efforts to correct people ’ s errors. Citizens need not be disturbed to learn what govern-
ment is doing, and there is no reason for regulators to keep their efforts secret. 38 
 Over and beyond error-correcting intervention, a  ‘ publicity principle ’ should 
apply to all choice architects, public and private alike. 39 Since lack of transpar-
ency is what renders an action  ‘ manipulative ’ , the publicity principle emerges as 
the most promising strategy to avoid behavioural interventions being dismissed 
as  ‘ manipulations ’ . 40 
 Several contributors to this volume highlight the importance of develop-
ing behavioural inspired approaches capable of enhancing people ’ s capacity to 
deliberate and make conscious decisions. 41 Quigley and Stokes identify the most 
immediate consequences fl owing from the adoption of a behavioural informed 
approach in EU law. They warn that turning to behavioural science for greater 
effectiveness and legitimation may bring its own set of ambiguities, which need 
to be properly addressed, not glossed over. In particular, they argue that nudging 
may exacerbate tensions between, on the one hand, efforts to improve the visibility 
and evidence base of EU action, through procedures such as regulatory impact 
analysis (RIAs) and, on the other hand, reliance on behaviourally savvy interven-
tions based on non-transparent manipulation of choice environments. In our 
view, such confl icts between transparency and effi cacy, when they arise, need to be 
dealt with in an open and transparent manner. It would be worth asking people in 
Europe (and perhaps elsewhere) if they would in principle, or in specifi c instances, 
consent to laws and regulation that take their fallibility into consideration. Our 
hunch is that they may very well do (we realise that this is a diffi cult claim to test 
as framing of the question would be crucial). 42 After all, most citizens — despite 
widespread present and optimism biases — do not think of themselves as super-
cognisant  homini oeconomici . 
 Feldman and Lobel offer an additional and converging argument in favour 
of openness and publicity. They base their claim in favour of designing more 
conscious behavioural interventions on grounds of procedural justice and on 
the expressive function of the law. In their view, when the law creates a choice 
 38  Jolls and Sunstein (n 18) 231. 
 39  R  Thaler and  C  Sunstein ,  Nudge:  Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness 
( New Haven ,  Yale University Press ,  2008 )  244 . 
 40  This is however not to deny that even with full transparency there is a risk of some degree of 
manipulation. Sunstein,  ‘ The Ethics of Nudge ’ (n 1). 
 41  See in this volume  ch 2 by Di Porto and Rangone,  ch 3 by Quigley and Stokes,  ch 4 by van Aaken, 
as well as  ch 13 by Feldman and Lobel. 
 42  The European Commission Joint Research Center entrusted one of us (Alemanno) to run a map-
ping exercise aimed at gaining an understanding of the practice, perceptions and institutional designs 
of behavioural informed approaches across the EU. A report is expected to be published by the end 
of 2015. 
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 architecture, there is a risk that its expressive function is de-activated. As a result, 
the law would shape behaviour but not its underlying values. This, they argue, 
does not only reduce deliberation; it may also change the function of the law. 
 While we are aware of the limits of current EU practice of RIAs, we believe 
nevertheless that a fully-fl edged regulatory impact assessment, inclusive of RCTs, 
would constitute the privileged framework for incorporating behavioural con-
siderations into EU policy-making. A revised framework for impact assessment 
should be equally open to the consideration of all regulatory tools, as traditional 
tools initially put in place with no particular regard for behavioural insights may 
very well prove behaviourally sound. 43 Within this process of regulatory analysis, 
behavioural considerations may not only allow policymakers to consider a broader 
set of regulatory options and test their effectiveness through RCTs, but also to 
empower citizens to have a say through the public consultation process accom-
panying IAs. This might increase the accountability of the regulatory  outcome 
and most importantly address the  ‘ manipulation ’ concern often raised vis- à -vis 
nudge-type interventions. 
 D. Cultural Differences in Regulatory Philosophy 
 At a very general level, the sentiment on the relationship between governmental 
action and autonomy, although largely underpinned by political philosophy con-
siderations, is considerably shaped by culture. As Europe and the United States 
differ considerably in relation to their general perception of libertarian arguments, 
the legitimacy debate surrounding the behavioural intervention presents different 
contours.  ‘ Many Americans abhor paternalism ’ . 44 This is why in the US it makes 
sense to brand nudging as  ‘ libertarian paternalism ’ :  ‘ libertarian ’ makes paternal-
ism more acceptable. In Europe, fewer are bothered by paternalism and tagging a 
policy proposal as libertarian is a lot less likely to constitute an effective market-
ing strategy. Indeed, such branding may well be counter-productive as, in many 
European countries  ‘ libertarian ’ is considered extreme and even  ‘ liberal ’ is loaded 
with antisocial connotations. 45 Libertarian and liberal are polarising rather than 
consensual terms in the public debate. 
 43  See, eg in the US, Executive Order 12866 establishes a requirement of cost-benefi t analysis. 3 CFR 
 § 638 (1994); in the EU, European Commission,  ‘ Impact Assessment Guidelines ’ , SEC(2009) 92. For a 
timid attempt at integrating behavioural insights into EU policy-making, see Joint Research Centre, 
EU Commission,  ‘ Applying Behavioural Sciences to EU Policy-making ’ (2013), available at  ftp.jrc.es/
EURdoc/JRC83284.pdf . 
 44  CR Sunstein,  ‘ It ’ s For Your Own Good! ’ Book Review of Sarah Conly ’ s  Against Autonomy , The 
New York Review of Books (April 2013) 1. 
 45  Libertarianism is a compartively extreme form of liberalism that emphasises the value of indi-
vidual autonomy and liberty. See  E  Mack and  GF  Gaus ,  ‘ Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: 
 The  Liberty Tradition ’ in  GF  Gaus and  C  Kukathas (eds),  Handbook of Political Theory ( London , 
 Sage ,  2004 ) . 
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 Europe does not only offer a specifi c institutional context, posing its own chal-
lenges for testing, implementing and embedding behaviourally informed  policies. 
It is also a unique, composite polity, in which, as the above example suggests, words 
do not always carry the same connotations or even meaning than in the US. 46 Such 
differences in word use are not only of academic interest. They can have practical 
consequences, notably because what is politically realistic creates an often implicit 
fi lter through which even scholars view what lessons from behavioural sciences 
could profi tably be put to use in the sphere of rule-making. 47 In the US, scholars 
who present their research as behavioural law and economics may have  ‘ trimmed 
their sails ’ by discarding from their analysis insights from psychology that support 
policy intervention of a kind they are not keen to advocate or do not judge politi-
cally viable. 48 In Europe, where there is only a niche market — with less demand 
and as a result less supply — for non-paternalistic policies, the same fi lters are less 
likely to apply. The EU may well offer waters where it will be possible hoist the 
behavioural sails more fully. This is all the more so that legal culture in Europe 49 
appears welcoming to behavioural insights. More specifi cally, as Cserne points out, 
one distinctive characteristic of EU law is its goal-oriented nature and broad reli-
ance on purposive, consequence-based legal reasoning ( ‘ effet utile -style ’ ). 50 These 
traits are not only compatible with but compellingly calling for a non-formalistic, 
empirically-driven approach to law. In brief, it almost comes naturally, especially 
in the light of the objectives pursued by the Union, 51 to look at EU law as a policy 
instrument for the pursuit of a better life. 
 The technocratic character of EU law-making constitutes a further relevant 
characteristic to assess the porousness of EU legal system to behavioural insights. 
Behavioural informed intervention is inherently technocratic, and it does not 
require per se the participation of citizens. Yet given the dual democratic legitimacy 
of the EU — which lies in both representative and participative democracy 52 — this 
top-down, technocratic-like intervention might prompt resistance to nudging. 
 Therefore, the legitimacy of this particular form of behavioural informed inter-
vention depends on citizens ’ acceptance of the technocratic and  ‘ manipulative ’ 
nature of the policy as well as on citizens ’ trust in the  ‘ choice architects ’ . In other 
words, the legitimacy critique boils down to the question of how comfortable 
citizens are with having experts and bureaucrats designing policies that reorient 
 46  See also in this volume,  ch 1 by A Alemanno and AL Sibony. 
 47  See the discussion in  ch 13 by Y Feldman and O Lobel. 
 48  R  Bubb and  RH  Pildes ,  ‘ How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why ’ ( 2014 )  127  Harvard 
Law Rev iew  1593 . 
 49  Using the singular does not suggest that the legal culture is uniform across Europe. On diversity 
within European legal culture, see  G  Helleringer and  K  Purnhagen ,  Towards a European Legal Culture 
( Nomos ,  Hart Publishing ,  2014 ) . 
 50  See in this volume,  ch 12 by P Cserne. 
 51  Art 3 TEU reads :  ‘ The Union ’ s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its people ’ . 
 52  See Art 10 TEU. A von Bogdandy,  ‘ Democratic Legitimacy of Public Authority beyond the State —
 Lessons from the EU for International Organizations ’ (2011) Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/11. 
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the exercise of their individual autonomy. 53 At this juncture, cultural differences 
between Europe and the US certainly play a role: while this deserves closer atten-
tion from political philosophers and political scientists and possibly a few qualifi -
ers, Europeans appear on the whole more tolerant of paternalist bureaucrats than 
Americans. 54 
 To sum up, while there is common ground between the EU and US when discuss-
ing the legitimacy dimension of behavioural intervention, the normative baselines 
for approaching it are clearly different. Given its socio-legal and political context, 
the EU is less likely to offer strong resistance to the use of behavioural insights in 
its own legal order. While institutional practice does not yet show widespread use 
of cognitive based regulatory intervention, the growing interest for behavioural 
studies at EU level — but also in a growing number of Member States 55 — does lend 
some support to our claim. 
 II. PRACTICABILITY 
 Once the legitimacy concerns have been overcome, the remaining questions per-
tain to how to effectively integrate behavioural sciences into policy-making. In 
other words, how can behavioural insights be used given the current state of sci-
ence on the one hand and legal constraints on the other? That is what we mean for 
practicability of behavioural informed intervention. 
 While behavioural sciences demonstrate the limits of rational action and provide 
a better understanding of human behaviour, there is no ready-made framework 
for incorporating their insights into policy-making. 56 This represents a challenge 
for both legal scholars, whose job is to design bridges between behavioural insights 
and the law, and policymakers, whose mission is to walk those very same bridges 
when making laws. Policy-making is context dependent. Policymakers should have 
regard to the scientifi c validity underlying behavioural fi ndings. Yet this aspiration 
to scientifi c rigour does not lead to a unique model of behavioural policy-making 
and the different cultural and social settings will play a role. 57 Operationalisation 
 53  We have addressed this concern and attempted to offer a solution in the previous section, 
(C)  ‘ Publicity and Collective Deliberation ’ . 
 54  For a comparative analysis of US and European societies, see  A  Martinelli ,  Transatlantic Divide 
( Oxford ,  Oxford University Press ,  2007 ) . See also  JQ  Whitman ,  ‘ Consumerism Versus Producerism: 
 A Study in Comparative Law ’ ( 2007 )  117  Yale Law Journal  340 . 
 55  See in this volume,  ch 1 by A Alemanno and AL Sibony. 
 56  See, eg, Science and Technology Select Committee,  Report on Behaviour Change (HL, July 2011); 
 ‘ A Practitioner ’ s Guide to Nudging ’  Rotman Management Magazine , available at  www-2.rotman.uto-
ronto.ca/facbios/fi le/GuidetoNudging-Rotman-Mar2013.ashx.pdf . 
 57  According to Dunlop and Radaelli, however, they also exist as endogenous factors shaping the 
integration of behavioural insights into policy-making. This would be due to nine different biases that 
may affect the outcome of regulatory impact assessment and, in particular, play to the detriment of the 
 ‘ do nothing ’ option. To correct this activism bias, they argue that it is important to include behavioural 
insights in training of the policymaker and make concrete proposals on how this can be done. See 
 ch 6 by C Dunlop and C Radaelli. 
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of  behavioural insights therefore calls for an analysis of two distinct dimensions: 
methodological challenges of behavioural policy-making and institutional 
requirements. 
 A. Methodological Challenges to Ensure Effectiveness 
 The promise of behavioural informed policy-making is to increase effectiveness 
of policies. However, critics put forward that one should not be too quick to infer 
improvement of policy outcome from the use of generalisations of existing empir-
ical studies. In fact, — as demonstrated by Feldman and Lobel — science provides 
many more insights than just the few lawyers tend to focus on when they fi rst 
discover a fi eld such as behavioural studies. 58 The gist of the critique is common 
to any legal use of science; it consists in a sound questioning of the proper infer-
ences that can be drawn from empirical studies to inform the law. Issues to con-
sider pertain to relevance of empirical data for legal use, 59 internal and external 
validity of studies, 60 as well as robustness. 61 All of these issues deserve to be put in 
perspective. The history of using science in law tends to repeat itself and is made 
up of cycles of irrational hopes on the part of lawyers that science will help solve 
the problems they face, followed by disappointment when it becomes clear that 
science answers different questions. 62 To break this cycle, policymakers and law-
yers need to adjust their expectations of what science can bring to their pursuits 
and recognise how much still needs to be decided without the support of science. 
 In relation to legal use of behavioural insights, fi ve major diffi culties arise. First, 
the ecological (or external) validity of experiments can be questioned: behavioural 
sciences are fundamentally empirical 63 and extant studies do not always analyse 
heuristics and biases in contexts that are relevant for regulation. For example, con-
sumers in a supermarket do not necessarily behave like students who are required 
to perform tasks on a computer in a lab. As a result, it cannot be assumed that real 
life agents fall victims of the very same cognitive errors made by experimental 
subjects or that they do to the same extent. This limitation is diffi cult to overcome 
because we lack a theory of cognitive function that could help predict how real 
life decisions are taken. 64 Because rational consumers with certain specifi c prefer-
ences and irrational consumers can end up making the same choices (eg of credit 
 58  See  ch 13 by Y Feldman and O Lobel. 
 59  See  ch 3 by M Quigley and E Stokes. 
 60  An experiment is said to have external validity when its outcome can be generalised to a real-
world setting, outside the laboratory. It is said to have internal validity when the outcome of the experi-
ment is not due to external factors that were not taken into account and measured in the experiment, 
ie when it reliably establishes a causal relationship between variables. 
 61  Robustness describes the possibility to reproduce experimental results with different data sets. 
 62  Feldman and Lobel,  ch 13 . 
 63  eg  A  Tor ,  ‘ The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law ’ ( 2008 )  4  Haifa Law Review  237 . 
 64  D  Schwartz ,  ‘ Regulating for Rationality ’  Stanford Law Review (forthcoming). 
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card contract or phone plan), policymakers cannot know which fraction of the 
observed behaviour is the product of bias rather than rational choice. 65 A distinct 
but related concern about ecological validity is to do with the fact that relatively 
little is known about the sensitivity of the human cognitive and emotional foibles 
to cultural differences. This issue is particularly weighty in the European context, 
where the same legislation applies from Portugal to Poland. More studies will be 
needed to distinguish universal from culturally-sensitive biases before the results 
of studies conducted in one country can be extrapolated to others. 
 Second, the temporal dimension of infl uencing mechanisms is often over-
looked. Many studies document immediate effect of context on decision but leave 
open the question of how lasting the effects measured are. This is exemplifi ed by 
mandatory information schemes, such as pictorial warnings used in tobacco prod-
ucts. The effectiveness of warnings tends to decrease over time as the novelty effect 
wears off. 66 More critically, the specifi c effects of behavioural-change policies are 
diffi cult to discern from those stemming from the overall policy action, which may 
also include non-behavioural-informed action. 
 Third, studies that evidence the existence of a bias are rarely informed about 
how widespread that bias is in the population. This is generally referred to as the 
heterogeneity problem. 67 Citizens differ in the degree to which they display vari-
ous biases, due to individual characteristics but also experience. Actual consum-
ers are more experienced than experimental subjects insofar as the latter usually 
face the experimental task for the fi rst time. Individuals also differ materially in 
their cognitive styles, some being more analytical and others more intuitive. In 
addition, the current behavioural studies commonly test for one bias at the time. 
However, given the possibility that several biases affect an agent ’ s choice at the 
same time, policymakers should be aware of the  ‘ many bias ’ problem. 68 Moreover, 
behavioural studies may not indicate how intense a distortion of decision pat-
terns the bias causes. This raises the question of whether debiasing intervention 
is warranted where one lacks knowledge about the extent of the problem to be 
cured. From a policy standpoint, the issue is not only whether the benefi ts exceed 
costs. Distribution effects are also diffi cult to assess: if, for example, one seeks to 
protect consumers from making a certain type of mistake, the intervention will 
likely impose costs on regulatees and, ultimately, on the consumers who did not 
need the protection in the fi rst place, because they might be capable of debiasing 
themselves. 69 
 65  Schwartz, ibid, names this problem  ‘ observational equivalence ’ : rational consumers and irrational 
consumers behave in ways that are  ‘ observationally equivalent ’ from the point of view of the regulator. 
 66  GT  Fong ,  D  Hammond , and  SC  Hitchman ,  ‘ The Impact of Pictures on the Effectiveness of 
Tobacco Warnings ’ ( 2009 )  87 ( 8 )  Bull World Health Organisation  640 . 
 67  See, eg Schwartz (n 64). 
 68  ibid. 
 69  C  Camerer et al,  ‘ Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 
 “ Asymmetric Paternalism ” ’ [ 2003 ]  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  1211 ; and Schwartz (n 64). 
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 Fourth, public authorities seem to lack a full picture of the fi elds of 
behavioural research that must shape the policymaker ’ s toolbox. 70 This is largely 
due to a narrow reading — sometimes use 71 — of the relevant behavioural literature 
that has been studied by the proponents of behavioural informed policy-making 
and taken up by governments. As result of such a selective understanding of behav-
ioural insights, policymakers may enact limited and sometimes inadvertent policy 
recommendations that are based on a partial view of the scope and potential of the 
various branches of psychology. Trade-offs between different types of solutions 
are pervasively present in the adoption of policies addressing social challenges. In 
order for policymakers to become wiser consumers of the discipline of judgement 
and decision-making, 72 they must be better trained to recognise these trade-offs. 
 The fi fth challenge posed by legal use of behavioural insights is linked to what 
may be called the granularity gap. Legal rules are general. Psychologists focus 
instead on context-dependence: they study how various contextual parameters 
infl uence decisions. Yet, the law needs to be written to apply in a variety of con-
texts. Rules cannot distinguish beyond a certain level of detail and, due to the 
inherent coarseness of legal categories (eg professional seller and consumer), they 
cannot account for a myriad of circumstances, which may weigh on individual 
decisions (eg the colour of the background of an e-commerce website, the music 
in a restaurant). This implies that a wealth of behavioural knowledge might be 
too detailed to appear on the radar of lawyers, who observe the world through a 
low-resolution screen. 
 To address these concerns, it has been proposed that behaviourally informed 
interventions be tested prior to any large-scale and general implementation. 73 The 
aim of a behavioural study is to gain a better understanding of how people act 
and sometimes think and feel too. Several methodologies are currently used for 
putting policies to test. The most widely used method is surveys. They consist in 
questioning a large sample of individuals about their attitude, beliefs and expecta-
tions through a questionnaire. While the way in which the questionnaire is framed 
may greatly infl uence the outcome, surveys generally score high in terms of exter-
nal validity as they capture what people  ‘ out there ’ think. Yet, because stated pref-
erences may not coincide with revealed preferences (the intention – action gap), 
surveys are not always the best instruments to predict how people will act in prac-
tice. Experiments constitute a second method, which partly addresses the major 
limitation of behavioural surveys. An experiment reconstructs in the controlled 
environment of a lab a decision context that bears some resemblance to a policy 
relevant situation. It is then designed to measure how subjects respond to a change 
 70  See  ch 13 by Feldman and Lobel. 
 71  Bubb and Pildes (n 48). 
 72  O  Amir and  O  Lobel ,  ‘ Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and 
Policy’ ( 2009 )  108  Columbia Law Review  2098, 2122 . 
 73  The leading guidance is offered by the UK Behavioural Insights Team and is called EAST (Easy, 
Attractive, Social and Timely). See UK Cabinet Offi ce/NESTA,  ‘ EAST, Four Simple Ways to Apply 
Behavioural Insights ’ (2013). 
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in one element that mimics a policy choice. This enables us to draw conclusions on 
the effect of the manipulated element on participants ’ actual behaviour. By iden-
tifying cause-and-effect relationships, experiments may provide reliable results 
that are replicable in different places and at different times. Because laboratory 
experiments involve relatively small samples, it is crucial that they be designed so 
as to ensure their representativeness of the real world. However, ideally, behaviour 
should be observed in its real environment as opposed to laboratory settings. 74 The 
methodology enabling such an observation is generally referred to as randomised 
control trial (RCT). 75 In line with a feature of medicine established since the last 
century, this methodology is aimed at empirically testing different policy options, 
measure and compare outcomes. RCTs are specifi c experiments in which the effi -
cacy of an intervention is studied by comparing the effects of the intervention on a 
population that is randomly divided into groups. The groups are exposed to a dif-
ferential course of treatment: one of them — the control group — is not treated (or 
receives a  ‘ placebo ’ ), whilst the other group — the intervention group — is exposed 
to the  ‘ treatment ’ . The impact of the intervention is then measured by comparing 
the results in both groups. 
 The rationale behind the extension of RCT from the pharmaceutical sector to 
that of public policy-making must be found in the promise of highly effective 
results of behavioural intervention at low cost. A behavioural intervention is said 
to  ‘ work ’ when it is capable of producing the desired change in behaviour on the 
targeted population. It is against this backdrop that controlled experiments on 
new regulatory measures are set to become the new benchmark to assess the real 
impact of a proposed governmental intervention. 76 The emerging use of RCTs in 
policy-making is therefore perceived as an approach capable of assessing  in con-
creto the impact of regulatory measures, in contrast to conventional regulatory 
impact analysis (RIAs). RIAs are traditionally performed on the basis of prospec-
tive, and therefore theoretical, calculations of costs and benefi ts. 77 It is, however, 
not always possible to run RCTs and therefore other methods, such as survey, 
experiments as well as qualitative research techniques, 78 can be used to appraise 
new behavioural policy proposals. 
 74  See, eg  M  Abramowicz ,  I  Ayres , and  Y  Listokin ,  ‘ Randomizing Law ’ ( 2011 )  159 ( 4 )  University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review  929 . 
 75  For an introduction to RCTs in policy-making, see  R  Glennerster and  K  Takavarasha ,  Running 
Randomized Evaluations:  A Pratical Guide ( Princeton ,  Princeton University Press ,  2014 ) . 
 76  See the document produced by the UK Government,  Test, Learn, Adapt Developing Public Policy 
with Randomised Controlled Trials (2012) available at  www.gov.uk/government/publications/test-
learn-adapt-developing-public-policy-with-randomised-controlled-trials , as well as that elaborated 
by the Joint Research Centre of the EU Commission and edited by R van Bael,  ‘ Applying Behavioural 
Sciences to EU Policy-Making ’ (2013), available at  ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC83284.pdf . 
 77  C  Sunstein ,  Simpler. The Future of Government ( New York ,  Simon  & Schuster ,  2013 )  187 . 
 78  These include several research methods, used in qualitative behavioural sciences, such as focus 
groups, semi-structured interviews and participant observation. 
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 Although no specifi c methodology to assess behavioural informed interven-
tions has imposed itself, the use of RCTs and other supporting evidence might 
contribute, by becoming easily reproducible in different jurisdictions, to render 
behavioural policy-making scalable in nature. 79 While the methodological diffi -
culties that we have illustrated in this section seems to mitigate the universalistic 
narrative that is currently characterising the nudge discourse and facilitating its 
rapid diffusion, they also urge the scientifi c and policy community to embrace a 
culture of policy testing. 
 B. Institutional Design of Behavioural Policy-Making 
 The question of how to best organise the integration of behavioural policy-
making within current governmental settings is also particularly relevant in today ’ s 
cognitive based regulation debate. The UK, being the fi rst mover, seems to have set 
up the golden standard for behavioural institutional design: a dedicated unit, the 
Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), initially placed within the Cabinet Offi ce, and 
made of few experts, specialised in several behavioural disciplines, who work in 
direct contact with the different government departments. When advising public 
administrations or charities on the integration of behavioural insights, the BIT 
relies on a wide range of practical measures to change citizens ’ behaviour, spanning 
from re-wording the content of letters sent by public authorities to taxpayers 80 
to using small  ‘ thank you ’ gifts to reward charitable donations. 81 An institutional 
experience whose development appears almost antithetical to that of the UK can 
be observed in Denmark, where a bottom-up organisation, called iNudgeU, ani-
mated by academics, civic advocates and behavioural professionals, has created 
a self-proclaimed Danish Nudge Network. 82 Interestingly enough, while the BIT 
has acquired its autonomy from the Cabinet Offi ce and been granted a private sec-
tor status, 83 the Danish Nudge Network has progressively been incorporated into 
the Danish Government. If they differ in the chronology and direction of change 
between public and private sector, both experiences however have in common that 
 79  On RCTs as applied to policy-making,  R  Jones ,  J  Pykett , and  M  Whitehead ,  Changing 
 Behaviours — On the Rise of the Psychological State ( Cheltenham ,  Edward Elgar ,  2013 )  174 . 
 80  Paper of the Behavioural Insight Team,  ‘ Applying Behavioural Insights to Reduce Fraud, Error 
and Debt ’ (2012) available at  www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
fi le/60539/BIT_FraudErrorDebt_accessible.pdf; in 2013, the British tax authority HMRC applied some 
of the insights presented in the paper to adopt a variation on the standard letter used to urge taxpayers 
to fi le their returns on time. 
 81  cf: Paper of the Cabinet Offi ce and Behavioural Insight Team,  ‘ Applying Behavioural Insights 
to Charitable Givings ’ (2013) available at:  www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/fi le/203286/BIT_Charitable_Giving_Paper.pdf . 
 82  A similar experience emerged in Norway where the Stordalen Foundation launched green nudges. 
 83  The Unit still provides services to the UK Government but also to private sector entities and 
foreign governments.  www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/ . 
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a dedicated unit has been created. An alternative or complementary model would 
be to educate policymakers in government departments on a wider scale. 84 
 Across Europe, the level of nudge awareness is very diverse: 85 in many countries, 
the initial excitement about the novelty of behavioural sciences and its innovation 
potential has not yet reached the policy-making circles, let alone legal academia. 
We might call this the pre-nudge stage, meaning that the eponymous book has not 
yet been widely read. A second circle is made up of countries in incipient nudge 
stage, where awareness of behavioural regulation is present but restricted to very 
restricted circles. In this category, Germany 86 and France 87 have shown some sign 
of interest for behavioural policy-making, but, at the time of writing, it is not clear 
whether they will go as far as to set up dedicated units. In the Netherlands, the Sci-
entifi c Council for Government Policy (WRR) recently published a report entitled 
 Policy-Making with Knowledge of Behaviour . 88 The UK, and partly Denmark, rep-
resent a more mature nudge stage, where cognitive based interventions are tested, 
used and publicly debated. No country seems to have reached a post-nudge stage 
yet. Of course, these stages — and possibly others that would need to be added —
 form a continuum. In addition, there may be different styles of nudge maturity. In 
the European context, the development of Member State expertise about behav-
ioural regulation progresses in parallel with developments at EU level. In time, 
this may raise questions regarding the federalism of behavioural  regulation. 89 In 
particular, it will be interesting to observe whether and how behavioural argu-
ments may be brought to bear on subsidiarity appraisal, for example, if  Member 
States can establish that, in some policy areas, different behavioural patterns  justify 
 regulation at national rather than at EU level. 
 In the meantime, the European Union established a  ‘ Foresight and Behavioural 
Insights Unit ’ , which is located within the EU Commission Joint Research Centre. 
The unit ’ s raison d ’ ê tre is to centralise the efforts currently undertaken by some 
Directorates General of the EU Commission, such as DG Consumer Protection 
and Health (SANCO), to integrate behavioural insights into EU policy-making. 
By overcoming the current institutional fragmentation, the unit is expected to 
develop a robust methodology and to foster a behavioural mindset among the 
 84  CR  Sunstein ,  ‘ Nudging:  A Very Short Guide ’ ( 2014 )  37  Journal of Consumer Policy  583, 587 . 
 85  At the time of writing the European Commission is engaged in a mapping exercise aimed at 
 collecting practices of behavioural policy-making across its Member States. Its outcome is expected to 
be published in the form of a report by the end of 2015. 
 86  In Germany, the Government announced it was hiring psychologists, behavioural economists as 
well as anthropologists to test new methods of  ‘ effi cient government ’ , P Plickert and H Beck,  ‘ Kanzlerin 
Angela Merkel sucht Verhaltensforscher ’ , FAZ, 26 August 2014,  www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/
wirtschaftspolitik/kanzlerin-angela-merkel-sucht-verhaltensforscher-13118345.html . 
 87  www.modernisation.gouv.fr/les-services-publics-se-simplifient-et-innovent/par-des-
services-numeriques-aux-usagers/le-nudge-au-service-de-laction-publique . 
 88  Thanks to Frederik Borgesius for the translation and for bringing this to our knowledge. The 
report (in Dutch) is available on the WRR website:  www.wrr.nl/publicaties/publicatie/article/met-
kennis-van-gedrag-beleid-maken/ . 
 89  See  ch 3 in by M Quigley and E Stokes. 
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EU Commission civil servants. It remains to be seen what infl uence this institu-
tional effort will have into the EU administrative culture and whether it will affect 
the national level. For the time being, the EU  ‘ Nudge Unit ’ has not yet decided 
which of the various institutional design models to embrace — if any. Given the EU 
constitutional and institutional specifi cities, one cannot rule out that the EU will 
develop a new, autonomous model. 
 Also the OECD is showing some interest for behavioural approaches to regula-
tion. After the publication of a report on  Behavioural Economics and  Policymaking , 90 
the OECD is set to include  ‘ behavioural economics ’ in its 2015 Regulatory Policy 
Outlook. One may therefore expect the OECD to recommend its members to tap 
into the potential of behavioural fi ndings when conceiving their better regulation 
agenda. Given the OECD ’ s success in promoting innovative regulatory approaches, 
its embrace of behavioural regulation could be instrumental to the diffusion of a 
behavioural orientation to governments of its member countries. 
 The benefi t of behavioural insights is not reserved to rich countries. The World 
Bank placed behavioural approaches at the centre of its  World Development Report 
2015 . 91 By integrating a behavioural perspective on development policy, this report 
provides a richer understanding of why people save, use preventive health care, 
work hard, learn, and conserve energy. It provides a basis for innovative and inex-
pensive interventions and highlights the following elements for policy attention: 
the role of choice architecture; the scope for social rewards; frames that infl uence 
whether or not a norm is activated; information in the form of rules of thumb; as 
well as opportunities for experiences that change mental models or social norms. 
 While it might be too early to salute the emergence of a global behavioural 
policy-making movement, there is clearly a common trend among this set of 
recent initiatives taking place at national, European and international level. 92 
 III. CONCLUSIONS 
 Contributions to  Nudge and the Law individually and collectively demonstrate that 
the dominant policy models in the EU are based on a rather na ï ve understanding 
of what drives behaviour. These models assume people tend to make insightful, 
well-planned and informed decisions guided by considerations of personal utility. 
This assumption seems shared across policy areas. Behaviourally informed policy-
making is instead cognisant of the role played by framing and defaults, by the gap 
between intention and action as well as by the many other perceptions, impulses, 
judgements, and decision processes that characterise human decision-making. It 
 90  P  Lunn ,  Regulatory Policy and Behavioural Economics ( Paris ,  OECD ,  2014 ) . 
 91  World Bank Group ,  World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behavior ( Washington , 
 DC ,  World Bank ) available at openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20597. 
 92  For an analysis of the political economy of nudging, see HW Micklitz,  The Politics of Behavioural 
Economics , 31 January 2015 (on fi le with the editors). 
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is against this backdrop that behavioural insights, by providing a more nuanced, 
realistic account of how people make decisions, may offer European Union law a 
fertile ground upon which it can develop more effective, less costly policies mak-
ing life easier for most citizens. 
 Yet the promises accompanying the emergence of behavioural policy-making 
must be analysed — in the European Union as elsewhere — in the light of the two 
most serious sources of reservations that this phenomenon has prompted thus far: 
its legitimacy and practicability. 
 The legitimacy challenge for behavioural regulation can be viewed through the 
prism of two trade-offs: fi rst, between the desire to preserve autonomy and the 
inevitability of  ‘ choice architecture ’ and, second, between the aspiration to refl ec-
tive decision-making and the reality that  ‘ mental bandwidth ’ is a scarce resource. 
The framework that is needed to approach these challenging trade-offs should 
include the need not only to respect individual deliberation but also openness 
and collective deliberation. This is where the practical challenges of behavioural 
policy-making, and more specifi cally, those of institutional design reside. 
 Although there is no single ready-made framework for incorporating behav-
ioural insights into policy-making, several efforts have been undertaken to assist 
policymakers in determining whether and how to consider behaviour when leg-
islating. On the one hand, policymakers are increasingly getting acquainted with 
several methods for conducting behavioural studies, such as experiments, survey, 
and RCTs. On the other hand, while no institutional framework emerges as prefer-
able over the others, several options exist to design institutional settings capable 
of ensuring some behavioural consideration in policy-making. Policymakers can 
count on several institutional approaches when it comes to refi ne their under-
standing of human behaviour in the policy process, be it a dedicated unit within 
government or a looser network of experts providing on-demand advice to 
government. 
 The current approaches display shortcomings: the lack of a cognitive theory, 
the absence of a framework for deciding in face of heterogeneity at the popula-
tion level and the diffi culties to extrapolate from extant behavioural studies. They 
also share a positive common feature: they strive to inject a culture of testing and 
experimentation into policy-making. As such, they belong to a broader trend 
aimed at inserting evidence into policy-making in order to invest limited public 
funding into those policies that  ‘ work ’ . This trend is effectively conveyed by the 
title of a recent book:  Show Me the Evidence . 93 Rather than relying on anecdo-
tal evidence or, what is worse, emotions, behaviourally informed regulation tends 
to emerge as more evidence-based than conventional regulation. 94 Importantly, 
 93  R  Haskins and  G  Margolis ,  Show Me the Evidence — Obama ’ s Fight for Rigor and Results in Social 
Policy ( Washington  DC ,  Brookings Institution Press ,  2014 ) . 
 94  Yet this is not to suggest that policymakers should automatically infer from behavioural studies 
that  ‘ everyone is crazy or everyone is sane ’ . Policymakers must realise that in the absence of a  cognitive 
theory they cannot sensibly make inferences from subjects ’ laboratory choices to real life context. 
Schwartz (n 64). 
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behavioural sciences broke the monopoly of economics as the only social sci-
ence that is recognised as relevant and useful by policymakers. 95 That is where the 
major promise of behavioural regulation lies in today EU ’ s policy-making: a more 
open and evidence-informed approach to policy development. 
 Several constitutional traits of the European Union suggest that its policy-mak-
ing could not only accommodate but also benefi t from the integration of new bod-
ies of evidence, such as behavioural sciences. First, the goal-oriented drive behind 
EU policy-making seems particularly prone to empirically driven approaches to 
law. Second, the fact that EU legislation is initiated by the Commission, a techno-
cratic, non-elected body endowed with sizeable resources and largely insulated 
from immediate political pressure, may be conducive to evidence-based experi-
mentation. Third, the tension existing between the competence of the EU and that 
of its Member States, which is typical of any federal system, might fi nd comfort 
in the integration of a body of knowledge capable of injecting fresh empirical 
guidance on how to draw, interpret and operationalise that demarcation line. The 
appeal of behavioural-informed approaches should not lead us to underestimate 
the signifi cance of their effects on legal systems. While behavioural considera-
tions may allow policymakers to consider a broader set of regulatory options and 
test their effectiveness through RCTs, their use should be subject to public as well 
as constitutional scrutiny so as to increase the accountability of the regulatory 
outcome. 
 Despite the potential role that behavioural insights might play in informing 
EU policy-making, research on the proper and appropriate use of behavioural 
insights in policy-making is still in its early days. In Europe, a lot of work remains 
to be done. 96 Without ruling out that they may be similarities with questions dis-
cussed in the US context, this volume demonstrates that the approach undertaken 
by the US-dominated scholarship on behaviourally informed intervention is not 
always best suited to address legal and policy issues in the EU. It is by keeping in 
mind this caveat that we hope to have made a case for more joint involvement 
of EU legal scholars and empirical researchers into this promising interdiscipli-
nary fi eld of study. Lawyers may indeed signifi cantly contribute to development 
of behavioural policy-making. First, by complementing the role played by econo-
mists or other experimental researchers — in particular psychologists  – , they can 
raise a set of legally relevant questions in the design of behavioural experiments. 
 Second,  lawyers may contribute to provide context to the conception and exe-
cution of those experiments thus contributing to render them less abstract and 
more policy-relevant. Third, lawyers as well as other actors involved in the legal 
 95  D  Kahneman , Foreword to  E  Shafi r (ed),  The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy ( Princeton , 
 Princeton University Press ,  2012 )  vii . 
 96  We echo here the call of Tor for an increased breadth of behavioural law and economics (beyond 
the US and beyond the fi elds of law that have drawn most scholarly attention so far).  A  Tor ,  ‘ The 
Next Generation of Behavioural Law and Economics ’ in  Klaus  Mathis (ed),  European Perspectives on 
 Behavioural Law and Economics ( Heidelberg ,  Springer ,  2015 )  17 . 
Epilogue: Future of EU Behavioural Policy-Making 347
profession, such as judges and policymakers, may also offer a privileged yet largely 
unexploited sample for some behavioural testing. 97 They may contribute to 
encourage true cross-cultural behavioural studies by broadening the sample so as 
to render it more representative. To sum up, behavioural informed intervention 
needs lawyers as much as lawyers need behavioural considerations in their action. 
 It is in the light of the above that we hope that the chapters of this volume 
will be of use to future scholars. We view them as invitations to engage with the 
research agenda that we have strived to outline in this volume with the help of our 
contributors. 
 
 97  Student bodies have come to be the predominant study population for many psychology and 
behavioural researchers. However, a recent survey of the psychology and behavioural economics litera-
ture suggests that American college students are outliers, quite atypical of the world population. See 
 ‘ The University Student as a Model Organism ’ (2010) 13  Nature Neuroscience 521. 

